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[Vol. XXIV

THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN
PUBLIC UTILITY CONSUMER LAW
It is our job to see to it that you are given a chance to live. If
utilities will help, it is our job-our duty-to provide them.
We believe that a public utility has great public obligations. We
want to build better lives for all of us.
-A public utility advertisement,
The retention of valuable private interests has traditionally been pro2
tected by the due process clause. Technical classifications fostering a distinction between constitutionally guaranteed rights and governmental privileges have repeatedly hampered individuals seeking protection against
arbitrary governmental action.3 Since the individual has no inherent right
to governmental benefits, this dichotomy assumes that such benefits are not
entitled to constitutional protections.4 Uniformly applied, this distinction
5
has devastating effects on constitutional claims within the public sector.
8
6
Public housing tenants, welfare recipients,, university students, liquor
licensees, 9 and automobile drivers'0 may find themselves without constitutional protection upon termination or revocation of their interests." The
justification for such arbitrary governmental action has been that government is not obliged to confer anything, but if it does it merely confers a
12
privilege rather than a recognized right. Government, however, is more
1.

6 CLEARINGHOITSE

REV.

69 (1972).

2. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). The abolition of technical
classifications accounts for the increase in the number of these protected interests.
3. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (1968).
4. Justice Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., speaking for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, initiated the use of this distinction by denying the petition of a policeman who
had been dismissed for violating a regulation that restricted his political activities. Holmes
observed: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 115 Mass. 210,
29 N.E. 517 (1892).
5. Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 1441.
6. See Housing Authority v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290 (1966), vacated per
curiam, 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
7. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934); Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d
901, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224, 1226 (N.D. I1. 1969).
8. Compare Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934) (requirement to take military science course as condition of enrollment upheld), with Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961)
(procedural due process required for expulsion of students in good standing at tax-supported
colleges).
9. See Hornstein v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 412 Il. 365, 106 N.E.2d 354 (1952)
(summary revocation of liquor license without prior notice or hearing).
10. Burson v. Bell, 121 Ga. App. 418, 174 S.E.2d 235 (1970), rev'd, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
11. Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 1441.
12. The right-privilege distinction is merely declarative of the common law concept
of government as donor of benefits and privileges. The donee could not complain if, after
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than a benefactor; as an employer, customer, dispenser of welfare and
pensions, licensor of businesses and occupations it has become enmeshed in
the economic fabric of its citizenry.' 3 As a result, those who deal with the
Government may be forced to surrender constitutional rights because of
conditions appended to benefits received.- 4 Although the recipient may retain full rights by rejecting the proffered benefit, the fact remains that most
government benefits are vital to the economic well-being of the individual. 5
For most, there is little or no alternative to the acceptance of the conditions
attendant to the benefit.16
The purpose of this note is to examine the rationale for classifying
certain private interests as "entitlements," which are afforded due process
protection while also focusing on the reasons why public utility service
should be considered such an entitlement. The Florida Public Service Commission will, therefore, be analyzed to determine whether that body is
properly equipped to deal with constitutionally-protected rights. Finally,
suggestions will be offered for restructuring the regulation of public utilities
for more effective consumer protection.
THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF PROPERTY

Benefits conditionally conferred by the Government, which have been
afforded constitutional guarantees, often resemble a status more closely than
traditional property rights.'7 Often referred to as "government largess" these
new forms of wealth represent an individual's status in society and, therefore, may be the most meaningful property he possesses.' 8
A constitutionally-protected status may be threatened in various ways:
the right to apply may be denied, an application once submitted may be
denied, or conditions may be appended to a grant. The most frequent threat
to one's status, however, is revocation or suspension. Once a right or status
a time, the donor chose not to continue his generosity. If accepted, the donee took the

gift on the donor's terms. W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE,
1970).

CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw 548-55 (5th ed.

13. See Reich, supra note 2.
14. The bargaining process is accomplished by placing conditions on the receipt of
governmental benefits or privileges. "[I]f the legislature may withhold a particular benefit,
it may grant it in a limited form since the greater power of withholding absolutely must
necessarily include the lesser power of granting with restrictions." Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions,73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
15. Id. at 1595-96.
16. Id. at 1596.
17. Reich, supra note 2, at 733. "The valuables dispensed by government take many
forms, but they all share one characteristic. They are steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth - forms which are held as private property ....
The wealth of
more and more Americans depends upon a relationship to government. Increasingly, Americans live on government largess- allocated by government on its own terms, and held by recipients subject to conditions which express 'the public interest.'" Id.
18. Reich cites an individual's profession or occupation as a prime example. Thus, a
job is frequently more valuable than a house or bank account for a new house can be
bought and a new bank account created once a profession or job is secure. Id. at 738.
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has vested, tremendous hardship may result if it is suddenly withdrawn. 19
Courts have recognized that constitutional restraints limit state power to
terminate a status occupied by an individual in his relationship to the
Government2 ° More specifically, procedural due process is frequently made
a condition precedent to the termination or revocation of an entitlement.
An individual's most valuable status is usually that which furnishes his
income. This was recognized in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.21 where
pre-judgment garnishment of wages, absent notice and hearing, was barred.
Sniadach emphasized that wages are a special type of property right,22 and
noted: "Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing this prejudgment garnishment procedure violated fundamental principles of due
23
process."
Welfare benefits were given similar treatment in Goldberg v. Kelly24
where the Supreme Court held that these benefits, a statutory entitlement,
were important property rights that should be protected by notice and a
fair hearing prior to termination. -5 Welfare assistance, like wages, produces
a dependence upon an outside source for the daily necessities of life. Terminating welfare benefits without a prior hearing deprives the recipient of
his means of support, which in turn impairs his ability to seek redress
through administrative channels.

26

Government contracts are at the opposite end of the spectrum but are
entitled to the same constitutional protection as welfare benefits27 or unemployment compensation Although a government contract may not confer
19. Id. at 744.
20. E.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver licenses); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(disqualification for unemployment compensation); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)
(denial of tax exemption); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (discharge from public employment).
21. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
22. Id. at 340. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion observed: "The 'property' of
which petitioner has been deprived is the use of the garnished portion of her wages during
the interim period between the garnishment and the culmination of the main suit. Since this
deprivation cannot be characterized as de minimis, she must be accorded the usual requisites of procedural due process: notice and a prior hearing." Id. at 342.
23. Id.
24. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
25. Id. at 262. Speaking for five members of the Court, Justice Brennan wrote: "It
may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a
'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do
not fall within traditional common law concepts of property." Id. at 262 n.8. However, a
later case, upholding the practice of home visitation as a condition of continuing eligibility
for welfare benefits, asserted: "One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an
interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work."
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 319 (1971). This case, however, raised no issue of procedural
due process.
26. 397 U.S. at 264.
27. Id.
28. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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a legal right to do business with the Government, this does not mean the
Government can act arbitrarily, either substantively or procedurally. Before one is officially declared ineligible to bid for government contracts he
is entitled to challenge the process and evidence utilized in the admini29
strative decision.
Thus, certain relationships to the Government including welfare benefits,30 unemployment compensation, 31 driver licenses,3 2 government contracts, 33 public housing,s4 occupational licenses,35 and wages36 have been
termed "entitlements," ' 37 and should no longer be regarded as gratuities.
In considering whether the Government must act fairly the technical
classifications of the interests at stake should not be determinative. Instead,
the focus should be on the Government's obligation to the individual to
provide reasonable statutory regulation to preclude arbitrary action by state
officials. Since the Government can exercise many powers over individuals,
which would not be tolerated in private relationships, the Government is
obligated to act justly.38 Those criteria that hold Government responsible
in its dealings with private persons are encompassed within the requirements
of due process. The application of due process does not mean that a person
has an absolute right to a benefit conferred by the Government or that,
once conferred, it cannot be suspended. Instead, due process requires that
an initial application or a proposed termination be considered fairly and
rationally.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC UTILrrY CONSUMER LAW

The inclusion of public utility service in the category of private interests
entitled to constitutional protection is but a logical extension of the rationale
that protects other benefits bestowed or regulated by the government. Many
of the same considerations that protect welfare benefits and wages justify
compelling utilities or the state, acting through a utility, to adhere to procedural requirements for the protection of consumer rights. After subscribing to utility service, the consumer's dependency upon the continuation of
service places him at an enormous disadvantage when dealing with the
utility. 39 Once accustomed to utility service the consumer builds a life style

29. Gonzalez v.Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 574 (1964).
30. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
31. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
32. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
33. See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (1964).
34. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
35. See Willner v. Committee on Character &Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
36. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969).
37. "The idea of entitlement is simply that when individuals have insufficient resources to live under conditions of health and decency, society has obligations to provide
support, and the individual is entitled to that support as of right." Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1256 (1956).
38. Levinson, Toward Principles of Public Law, 19 J. Pun. L. 327, 329 (1970).

39. Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedures, 11 P.U.R. (ns.) 439, 443
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upon the presumption that service will not be terminated arbitrarily. Sudden
termination results not only in the loss of power, water, or communication
into the home, but also severely restricts the use of other property.
The inability of the utility consumer to choose from competing utilities
further reduces his ability to bargain effectively. 4° Since a utility franchise
usually preempts a service area, 41 the utility that terminates a customer's
service is also the exclusive dispenser of that service. Thus, the power of
termination, if arbitrarily or capriciously exercised, may result in treatment
42
violative of due process.
The most important reason, however, for regulating termination procedures is that utility service is essential to the consumer's social and physical
well-being. Light, heat, power, water, and communication are necessities of
life that can vitally affect the health, business, or personal comfort of the
consumer. t 3 Consequently, the judicial attitude is developing that termination of utility service without proper procedures, specifically notice and
prior hearing, constitutes a taking of property in violation of procedural
44
due process.
Before utility service can be constitutionally protected a utility must
act under color of state law.45 Action by governmentally owned and operated
public utilities is obviously state action, 46 however, action of a privatelyowned public utility has also been declared state action for purposes of the
United States Code, title 42, section 1983. In Ihrke v. Northern State Power
Co. 47 threatened termination of electric and gas service by a privately owned
utility constituted action sufficiently within color of state law to hold the
utility to constitutional restraints. The extent of municipal regulation through
an exclusive franchise, use of public property, payment of municipal taxes,
and review of service policies and rate schedules by the city council caused

(Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1935).
40. Public Util. Comm'n v. Camden & Rockland Water Co., 7 P.U.R. (n.s.) 232, 236
(Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1935).
41. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 167.22 (1969).
42. Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedures, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439, 443
(Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1935).
43. The Wisconsin Public Service Commission recognized this in 1935 during an
investigation of proposed deposit rules and disconnect procedures. Id.
44. See Boykin v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 440 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util.
1971) (telephone service was ordered restored to the subscribers after it had been interrupted
because of its alleged use for unlawful purposes by their son). The commission noted:
"One cannot ordinarily function in this day and age without a phone. Its use in emergency
is vital." Id. at 443. But see Holt v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 11 P.U.R.3d 502, 505
(Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1955) (the commission stated there was no constitutional right
to utility service, nor was it a property right, the deprivation of which violated federal
and state constitutions). Holt was cited in a more recent Massachusetts commission order
denying restoration of service terminated because of a disputed bill. Mass. Dep't of Pub.
Util. Order No. 15,932 (1969).
45. See 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 67-73 (1972) for a discussion of state action and public

utilities.
46. Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
47 .

F.2d ......
(8th Cir. 1972) (No. 71-1504, May 3, 1972).
....
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the utility to be so entwined with governmental control as to be a state
48
actor.
In Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co. 49 state action was recognized through
regulation by the state public utility commission. In that case the utility
not only operated through a state franchise but also acted under governmental authority in terminating service. Not all action by a regulated utility
is state action, "only the particular activity which comes under the umbrella
of a state statute or state authorized regulation."30
One of the first cases to argue for procedural due process in utility
termination was Drumgoole v. Pollis.51 In that case an employee of the utility
company attempted to enter a customer's home to seize gas and electric
meters pursuant to a state pre-judgment replevin statute.52 Seizure of the
meters for delinquent payments resulted in loss of utility service. Although
the consumer was consistently making monthly payments on the balance
of her gas and electric bills, service was summarily terminated. Since the
termination of utility service was equally as damaging as the withholding
of wages or welfare benefits the consumer asserted that she suffered the same
hardships involved in Sniadach and Goldberg.55
Drumgoole was decided on the basis of Laprease v. Raymours Furniture
Co.54 There, the New York replevin statute was declared unconstitutional
because it provided for seizure of property without a court order.55 The
procedure violated search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment
as well as procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.5 6 Laprease recognized that furniture and appliances, like the wages in
Sniadach, are a "specialized type of property presenting distinct problems
in our economic system,"5 7 the taking of which on the unilateral command
of an adverse party may impose extreme hardships.
Drumgoole was merely repetitive of Laprease in its constitutional objection to the validity of the pre-judgment replevin statute. The complaint
was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the utility consumer was
protected against summary termination of service. The same arguments

48. Id. at __ (slip opinion at 6).
49. 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972).

50. Id. at 246.
51. Civil No. 1970-347 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1971).
52. N.Y. Civ. PPAc. art. 71, §7102 (McKinney 1971). The 1971 amendment to the

statute provides, in part, that if the plaintiff seeks an order directing the sheriff to break,
enter, and search for the chattel the affidavit for seizure must state facts sufficient under
the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment to authorize such action. Id.
§7102 (c).
53. Brief for Plaintiff at 25-32, Drumgoole v. Pollis, Civil No. 1970-347
Jan. 19, 1971).
54. 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
55. Id. at 725.

(W.D.N.Y.

56. Id.

57. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
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opposing seizure of furniture and appliances apply to the seizure of gas
and electric meters, which terminate utility selvice. 55
Although Drumgoole was not decided on the merits of whether public
utility service is a right entitled to the protection of constitutional guarantees, a later case examined this issue. In Davis v. Weir 59 a tenant's water
service was terminated for the failure of his landlord to pay a delinquent
utility bill. Only the landlord received notice of the proposed termination
and the tenant had no opportunity to contest. The city was obligated to
furnish water, as a public service, to all members of the municipality upon
application, subject only to reasonable nondiscriminatory rules and regulations.60 The court noted:61
The fact that the city has undertaken to provide water to all members
of the municipality upon application . . . renders the important
benefit bestowed by the city sufficiently analogous to an "entitlement"
to satisfy any requirement along this line in the recent Supreme Court
decisions."
Therefore, public utility service qualified for many of the same procedural
requirements previously afforded other private interests prior to termination or revocation.
The plight of the consumer in Davis62 is analogous to that of the wage
earner in Sniadach63 and the walfare recipient in Goldberg.64 Both cases
protected a special type of property from summary termination. The protected right to wages in Sniadach was merely representative of those necessities of life, which were the real objects of the court's protection. 65 Similarly,
Goldberg held prior notice and hearing as the necessary protection for "the
means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care," 66 the
very means by which the recipient lives. Davis argued that these fundamental
guarantees must be extended to the right to water service. Since housing and
shelter are already among those essentials requiring due process before

58. Florida's pre-judgment replevin statute, FLA. STAT. §78.01 (1969), has been declared
unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due process of law. Procedural due
process in a replevin suit now requires notice and hearing before property can be seized.
Florida's statute was faulty because it did not require an initial showing that the goods
had been wrongfully detained nor did it allow for prior notice or opportunity to challenge
issuance of the writ. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
59. 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
60. Id. at 321.
61. Id.
62. 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
63. 395 U.S. 337 (1969); see Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
a Preliminary Injunction at 6-7, Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
64. 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see Memorandum at 6-7.
65. 395 U.S. at 340.
66. 397 U.S. at 264.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1972], Art. 7

PUBLIC UTILITY CONSUMER LAW

termination,67 utility service, an integral part of one's shelter, should be
afforded the same protection. 68 The common element in these cases is that
once the fundamental interest is abridged the person affected will inevitably
suffer a severe hardship.
Another federal court has recognized that utility service is an entitlement
that must be protected by procedural due process. In Palmer v. Columbia

Gas Co.69 termination procedures were successfully challenged as violative

of due process because they permitted an employee of the utility to enter

the customer's premises to disconnect the meter after a computer shut-off
notice was sent from a distant city. No opportunity to dispute the action
was permitted prior to termination. These procedures inflicted "hardships
upon the consumer that far transcend the loss of driving privileges ... delay
in paying unemployment compensation . . . or even the denial of direct
relief payments . . . .A person can freeze to death or die of pneumonia
much more quicldy than he can starve to death. Thus there is no question
of the entitlement involved. Neither is there any question that the [utility's]
shut-off procedures . . . are dearly offensive to even the most elementary
notion of what constitutes due process." 70
Duty To Serve
The value of public utility service is emphasized by its guarantee by
law. 71 Public service corporations are legally obligated to render for reasonable compensation and without unjust discrimination, prompt and efficient
service adequate to meet the requirements of the consumer.r2 This duty

67. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967); Escalera v. New York City
Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
68. In Davis the plaintiff argued: "The very definition of shelter or housing in the
urban environment today has come to mean more than four wails and a roof. It includes
utilities, safe access and reasonable maintenance and repair .

.

.

. Water can thus be

treated as either a direct necessity entitled to due process protection in its own stead or as
a definitional element and necessary concomitant of 'shelter,' which has been held to be
a necessity in Escalera [and] entitled to due process protection under the Goldberg analysis."
Memorandum at 8. See also Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
69. 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
70. Id. at 244.
71.

See generally Note, The Duty of a Public Utility To Render Adequate Service: Its

Scope and Enforcement, 62 CoL m. L. REv. 312 (1962). This obligation was originally
imposed by the common law. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kelly, 160 F. 316, 320 (6th Cir.
1908); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pac. Terminal Co., 128 F. Supp. 475, 490-91 (D.
Ore. 1953); Postal Cable Tel. Co. v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 177 F. 726, 729 (M.D.
Tenn. 1910).
72. Woodbury v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 57 Fla. 249, 258, 49 So. 556, 562 (1909);
Hildreth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 56 Fla. 387, 392, 47 So. 820, 821 (1909). A breach of this
duty may arise through negligence, an abuse of franchise privileges, or unjust discrimination
in the performance of a public service. Woodbury v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 57 Fla. 249,
258, 49 So. 556, 562 (1909).
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arises when a state permits a public service corporation to exercise the rights,
powers, and prerogatives of a public franchise7 3
Numerous courts have recognized this legal duty to serve. 74 Moreover,
most states have codified this duty into statutes requiring utilities to serve
every applicant who complies with the reasonable requirements imposed by
the utility.75 The duty to serve is further defined in the rules and regulations
promulgated by public service commissions for each utility.76 Furthermore,
a contract is not essential to establish reciprocal rights between a public
service corporation and the public. 77 These rights are implied by law 7s and
are enforceable because of the incalculable value of utility service to the
consumer.79 So universal is this principle that it was articulated by the
Supreme Court in 1929:8
The primary duty of a public utility is to serve on reasonable terms
all those who deserve the service it renders. This duty does not permit
it to pick and choose to serve only those portions of the territory
which it finds most profitable, leaving the remainder to get along
without the service which it alone is in a position to give.
Deposits
It should not be necessary that a consumer actually be receiving utility
service to be protected from arbitrary and discriminatory action by the
utility. As soon as service is offered to the community each potential customer
should be entitled to fair treatment when dealing with the utility. Access
to service cannot be denied to a consumer who complies with the rules and
regulations of the utilitySI As a condition precedent to service, however,

73. State ex rel. Ellis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 53 Fla. 650, 668, 44 So. 213, 219
(1907).
74. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. State ex rel. Malcolm, 107 Fla. 317, 144
So. 657 (1932); City of Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas & Elec. Power Co., 65 Fla. 404, 62
So. 919 (1913).
75. E.g., FLA. STAT. §366.03 (1969).
76. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE §§25-4.66, -4.70, -4.113, -6.44, -6.95 (1969).
77. City of Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas & Elec. Power Co., 65 Fla. 404, 62 So. 919
(1913).
78. One utility was prevented from discontinuing its service to the city despite an
allegation that municipal regulations were arbitrary and confiscatory. When the utility
received its corporate charter from the state authorizing it to engage in the manufacturing
and supplying of electricity, the company assumed a duty imposed by implication of law to
render a reasonably adequate service. This duty was enforceable where there was no adequate excuse for nonperformance. Id. at 410, 62 So. at 921.
79. Public Util. Comm'n v. Camden 8c Rockland Water Co., 7 P.U.R. (n.s.) 232, 236
(Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1935).
80. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 278 U.S. 300, 309 (1929).
81. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §366.03 (1969).
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most utilitiess2 require a deposit.8 3 The Florida Public Service Commission
permits deposits for telephone,8 4 electric, 5 gas,8 6 and water service.87 The
justification for such advance payments is found in the financial protection
they afford the utility and in the lessening of the burden on the paying
customers.88 The interest of the utility in preventing uncollectible debts8 9
must be balanced with the right of the consumer to receive service.
Arbitrarily-imposed deposits will result in a violation of the utility's duty
to serve all members of the public without discrimination.90
Equal protection of the law requires a reasonable relationship between
classifications of customers who must pay deposits and the purpose for which
they are made. 91 Therefore, a deposit structure that invidiously discriminates
against one class of consumers will not be tolerated. 92 Deposits may have the
effect of depriving some classes of people a basic necessity because they
cannot raise the sum necessary for a deposit.93
Property owners and persons with stable employment are often exempt
from the requirement of a deposit. 94 Thus, when lack of funds for deposits
82. Among those states that do not regulate consumer deposits for telephone service
are Idaho, Texas, North Dakota, Virginia, New Mexico, and Kentucky. In these states
the utilities themselves regulate deposits. However, the Maryland Public Service Commission
has adopted detailed regulations to govern residential consumer deposits for all utilities.
In determining the amount of the deposit, the utility must consider the consumer's employment, military service, credit, ownership of property, availability of a guarantor, and
whether the consumer is a former customer. In re Regulations Governing Customer Deposits & Related Credit Requirements by Gas, Elec., Steam Heating, Tel. Water & Sewage
Disposal Cos., Order No. 58,089, Case No. 6290 (Md. Pub. Ser. Comm'n 1970).
83. A. PRIES, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 258 (1969). See generally
Note, Public Utilities and the Poor: The Requirement of Cash Deposits from Domestic

Consumers,78 YALE L.J. 448 (1969).
84. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §25-4.109 (1969). See also Harris v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co., 88 P.U.R.3d 268 (Va. Corp. Comm'n 1971).
85. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §25-6.97. See also Cospelich v. Mississippi Power Co., 164 Miss. 88,

144 So. 38 (1932).
86. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §25-7.83 (1969).
87. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §25-10.72 (1969). See also Re Belvedere Water Co., 79 P.U.R.
3d 488 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1969).
88. A. PRar, supra note 83.
89. In some instances, however, it has been shown that a utility's average loss may be
as much on accounts without deposits as it is on accounts with deposits. E.g., Re Washington Gas Light Co., 82 P.U.R.3d 225, 229 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).
90. See generally Deposit Requirements for Utility Service, 89 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 56 (1972).
91. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305, 308-09 (1966).
92. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305
(1966). Contra, Nunemaker v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 P.U.R.3d 129 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1969) where the Commission upheld credit rules even though they made service
dependent upon such criteria as ownership of property, establishment of previous credit,
continuous employment, membership in a profession, or payment of a deposit. The Commission found that the rules were reasonably related to the purposes of the deposit and
therefore nondiscriminatory. Id. at 136-41.
93. Note, supra note 83, at 449.
94. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 7, submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court
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prevents the access to utility service, these classifications based on wealth
become suspect. 95 Moreover, utilities generally reserve the right to increase
a deposit if conditions warrant, and failure to pay the additional amount is
justification for termination. 96 A recent decision 9 7 from the District of Columbia refused to ban all credit deposits but allowed the utility to require
a deposit only if a credit check revealed a prospective customer to be a poor
credit risk. Furthermore, the utility could not require a deposit or withhold
service while the credit investigation was being conducted.
As a result of alleged inequities existent in a vague telephone deposit
rule, 98 the Florida Public Service Commission recently ordered a statewide
general investigation of telephone customer deposit practices. 99 The recent
attacks upon cash deposits reveals the need to strike a balance between the
necessity of protecting the utility from unpaid bills and the right of the
consumer to receive service. 1° ° The possibility that access to utility service
can be denied solely on the basis of wealth is inconsistent with the protection
of utility service by constitutional guarantees.
Utility Rates as a Tax
A municipality is not prevented from making a profit but is entitled to
charge rates for utilities that will yield a reasonable return on its investment. 01 An inequity suffered by many customers of municipally-owned
public utilities results, however, when profits made by the utility are contributed to the general revenue fund.10 2 In effect, the municipality is imposing a tax upon the consumer when excessive rates are used to provide
revenue for the general fund. While payment for utility service is a "fee,"
10 3
when the payment is deposited into the public treasury it is a "tax."'
from appeal of Wood v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 481 P.2d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr.
455 (1971), which upheld credit rules for telephone deposits as a valid classification not
violative of equal protection even though the distinctions were based on wealth.
95. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 8.
96. Cullinane v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 147 A.2d 768 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1959).
In Florida this right is reserved by Public Service Commission rules. FLA. ADMIN. CODE

§§25-4.113 (c), -6.105 (e) (1969).
97. In re Washington Gas Light, 82 P.U.R.3d 225 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).
98. See Price v. General Tel., No. 197,854 (Cir. Ct., Hillsborough County, Div. A, filed
in 1971). Section 25-4.109 of the Florida Administrative Code requires only that a deposit
collected by telephone companies be "reasonable."
99. In re General Investigation of Tel. Customer Deposits, Order No. 5247, Docket
No. 71500-TP (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Oct. 21, 1971).
100. See cases discussed in 89 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 56 (1972).
101. Klik's v. Dalles City, 216 Ore. 160, 179, 335 P.2d 366, 376 (1958). In one instance, however, the fair return was limited to that amount necessary for paying interest
and principal on general obligation bonds. City of Covington v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 313
S.W.2d 391, 395 (Ky. 1958).
102. In Whitehead v. City of Alexandria, Civil No. 15,211 (W.D. La., filed Nov. 24,
1969), afJ'd, 433 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1970), a class action was filed in Virginia by consumers
seeking to enjoin the city from setting utility rates so high as to provide revenue for the
city treasury. The suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
103. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. McConless, 183 Tenn. 635, 651, 194 S.WV2d 476, 483
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Although the contribution relieves taxation in other areas and provides
funds for municipal operations, a tax collected by excessive utility rates
should be prohibited for several reasons. First, a municipality possesses no
inherent power to tax. 0 4 Therefore, a tax imposed by a municipal utility
is unconstitutional unless it has been authorized by the legislature.10 5 The
tax should also be prohibited by reason of the distinction between the
governmental and proprietary functions performed by the municipality. 0 6
Levying taxes is a governmental function, but operating a utility is a
"private business" that does not entitle the operator to impose taxes. 0 7
ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES IN CONFORMITY WITH DUE PRocEss

Assuming utility service is an interest of sufficient worth to require due
process protection, procedures should be implemented to protect the consumer threatened with termination. Due process requires that such pro10 9
cedures be "meaningful"' 108 and "appropriate to the nature of the case."'
This may mean, however, that "a procedural rule which satisfies due process
in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every
case." o In most situations, notice and an opportunity to be heard are the
2
most fundamental aspects of due process."' The view espoused in Sniadach,"

(1946). See also Dickson v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 311 Ky. 781, 226 S.W.2d 672
(1949), where the distinction between a fee and a tax was explained: "'[A]ny payment
exacted by the state or its municipal subdivisions as a contribution toward the cost of
maintaining governmental functions, where the special benefits derived from their performance is merged in the general benefit, is a tax.' On the other hand, a fee is generally
regarded as a charge for some particular service." Id. at 786, 225 S.W.2d at 675.
104. City of Tampa v. Birdsong Motors, Inc., 261 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972); Pacific First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wash. 2d 347, 353, 178 P.2d 551, 554 (1947);
Weyerhauser Timber Co. v. Roessler, 2 Wash. 2d 504, 307, 97 P.2d 1070, 1072 (1940);
Walker v. City of Morgantown, 137 W. Va. 289, 296, 71 S.E.2d 60, 63 (1952).
105. Except for ad valorem taxes, municipalities may be granted the power to levy
taxes only by general law. E.g., FLA. CONSr. art. VII, §1, 9; City of Tampa v. Birdsong
So. 2d (1972); see City of
Motors, Inc., 261 So.2d 1, 3 (1971), af'd on rehearing,Phoenix v. Arizona Sash, Door & Glass Co., 80 Ariz. 100, 102, 293 P.2d 438, 459 (1956);
Town of Farmerville v. Mathews, 120 La. 102, 106, 44 So. 999, 1000 (1907); Nelson v. Mayor
of Homer, 48 La. Ann. 258, 259, 19 So. 271, 271-72 (1896).
106. Town of Heckleburg v. Northwest Ala. Gas. Dist., 170 So. 2d 792, 795 (Ala. 1964);
Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd. v. Campbell, 267 Ala. 561, 566, 103 So. 2d 165, 168
(1968).
107. Klik's v. Dalles City, 216 Ore. 160, 179, 335 P.2d 366, 576 (1958).
108. Armstrong v. Mayo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
109. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
110. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
111. In 1863 the Supreme Court announced this principle in Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 203 (1863), where an out-of-state creditor was not given the opportunity to be
heard in an insolvency proceeding. The Court said: "Parties whose rights are to be affected
are entitled to be heard; and in order that they enjoy that right they must first be notified.
Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity to make his defense." Id. at 233.
112. 395 U.S. 37 (1969).
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Goldberg,11 and Laprease11 4 requires notice and a hearing to establish the
validity or probable validity of an underlying claim against the individual
before he may be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use. 5s
Despite the great dependence upon utility service by the consumer,
certain circumstances may justify termination.1"6 Most utilities provide in
their regulations the grounds that justify termination, but procedural safeguards are essential to prevent unnecessary termination or inconvenience to
the consumer. Where the justification for termination is in dispute, notice
and a pre-termination hearing are the most effective procedures for initially
determining the validity of the reasons alleged for termination.
The usual justification for termination is to assist utilities in collecting
legitimate debts without resorting to the courts.1 7 The cost of collecting
small amounts in court is prohibitive to the utility as well as unduly expensive to the consumer." 8 Termination of service for such reasons has therefore been approved by a federal court in Florida. The court held that under
the rules of the Public Service Commission a utility would be guilty of inverse discrimination if it failed to terminate service for nonpayment where
the company's rules required such action." 9 However, where a bill is legitimately disputed summary termination is prohibited." 2
Other courts have distinguished between termination for nonpayment of
current bills as opposed to delinquent bills. 1 2 ' Termination for nonpayment

is usually thought of as a routine procedure if a customer's current bill is
not paid within a reasonable period.' 22 However, when a customer has paid
113. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
114. 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
115.

395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969)

(Harlan, J., concurring opinion).

116. In Florida the grounds for termination of service are set forth in the Florida
Administrative Code with specific grounds for each type of utility. FLA. ADMIN. CODE
§§26-4.113 (telephone service), 25-6.105 (electric service) (1969).

117. Note, supra note 71, at 326 n.90.
118. One state has viewed the power of termination as an extra-legal remedy to
be invoked by a utility only to enforce its legal rights. Termination may not be used to
compel a customer to pay a delinquent account within a unreasonable period or to impose

other unreasonable or burdensome conditions. Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect
Procedures, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439, 444 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1935).
119. Minor v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 P.U.R.3d 207, 208 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
The Minor court quoted from a Supreme Court decision upholding a utility's right to
enforce payment by suspension of service which said: "Some regulation establishing a mode
of inducing prompt payment of monthly rentals was necessary. It is not as if the company
had been free to act or not, as it chose. It was engaged in a public service which
could not be neglected. The protection of its own revenues and justice to its paying
patrons required that something be done." Southern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S.

482, 490 (1915).
120. Pringle v. Utilities Operating Corp., 177 So. 2d 684, 685 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965);
Public Util. Comm'n v. Camden & Rockland Water Co., 7 P.U.R. (n.s.) 232, 235 (Me.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1935).
121. E.g., Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedures, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439,
445 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1935).
122. See Komisarek v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 P.U.R.3d 44 (N.H. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1970).
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his current bill but has delinquent bills from past months, civil remedies
are the favored method of collection.123 This view is contrary to the justification for termination as the proper means of collecting legitimate debts.
However, it encourages consumers to make good-faith attempts to pay current bills even though past bills remain unpaid.
A frequent problem arising in the modern context of the landlordtenant relationship results when the tenant's utility service is terminated
for failure of the landlord to pay the bill.124 In most rental situations the
landlord contracts for water service with the utility. Instead of the tenant
being liable for payments to the utility, the service is included as partial
consideration for his rent. Nevertheless, it is the tenant who suffers interruption of service when payments fall into arrears.
Davis v. Weir 25 represents the typical tenant's dilemma. The specific
issue before the court was whether, under the city code, the tenant was entitled
to receive notice as well as the landlord.1 20 The applicable ordinance had
always been construed as relating to the person with whom the utility had
a contractual relationship, rather than the user. In Davis the landlord was
dearly liable for the delinquent bill and the tenant's liability was not in
dispute.127 Since liability was not disputed the court reasoned that a pretermination evidentiary hearing would serve no useful purpose,1 28 but the
court, nevertheless, required the tenant to be notified prior to termination.
This finding is inconsistent with the general principle of due process that
"one who is constitutionally entitled to be heard at all should be heard
before the change in status occurs." 12 1 In fact, the actual issue was the continued eligibility of the tenant to receive utility service, since he was to
suffer the consequences resulting from the delinquent payments of his land-

123. Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedures, 11 P.U.R. (ns.) 439, 445
(Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1935).
124. Cf. Puckett v. City of Muldraugh, 403 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966) (upholding
the validity of a municipal ordinance that authorized a water utility to charge owners
whether or not they or their tenants occupied the premises).
125. 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
126. "Section 33-129 of the 1965 Code of Ordinances of the City of Atlanta provides:
'The manager is required to give three days' notice to the owner or tenant before cutting
off the water supply for non-payment of bills. This notice may be served upon the tenant
or sent by mail to the last known address of the owner.'" Id. at 319 n.3.
127. The Department of Water Works never contended the "tenant [was] legally liable
for the water bill and the Court does not envision circumstances in which the Water Department would contract with the landlord . . . attempt to collect the bill from the landlord, attempt to terminate water service because the landlord had not paid the bill and
then contend that the tenant is liable for the bill." Id. at 322.
128. In cases like Bell v. Burson, Sniadach, and Goldberg "the validity and reasonableness of the summary governmental action depended upon factual findings and, since
certain factual issues were the subject of conflict, a 'fair hearing,' with the attendant requirements of confrontation and cross-examination, was required as a matter of due process
of law." Id.
129. O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare PriorHearing Cases,

1970

SuPRE1ME COURT

Rav. 161, 169.
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lord and subsequent termination of service. 13° Thus, the question that
should have been determined at a prior hearing was whether a consumer,
not liable for delinquent payments, should be denied service.
The fact situation in Davis'31 is not unique. In Masszonia v. Washington 32 tenants living in a substandard apartment complex were granted an
injunction enjoining termination of utility service for nonpayment by the
landlord. Although the court realized it was without authority to force the
utility to continue service without payment, the case demonstrates the extreme to which action has been taken to ensure uninterrupted service. The
court directed the mayor to contract with the utility to provide free service
to the tenants. The court noted: "Where hundreds of residents, already
living a marginal existence in substandard housing, face a cutoff of water,
gas, and electricity, as they do here, with the attendant danger to health,
safety, and property that will accrue the municipality has a duty to exercise
its inherent power"' 33 to abate nuisances. Since failure to provide adequate
34
utility service was a violation of the housing code,1 the mayor also had
5
the authority to assess the costs as a tax lien against the property."3
A similar situation arises when a tenant is denied service because of de136
Absent legislative
linquent payments attributable to a previous tenant.
for charges inresponsible
a
tenant
make
cannot
utility
a
public
authority,
1 7
service at
terminate
cannot
utility
Moreover, a
curred by a prior tenant.
38
a consumer's home as a result of delinquent charges at his business address."
The necessity of a pre-termination hearing has been disputed where
39
there is an alleged illegal use of the equipment." For instance, when tele-

130. 328 F. Supp. at 322.
131. 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
132. 315 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971).
133. Id. at 533.
134. D.C. CODE ANN. §43-301 (1967).
135. 315 F. Supp. at 532.
136. Sections 25-4.113 (4) (a), -6.105 (8) (a) of the Florida Administrative Code specifically
prohibit denial of service because of arreage owed by a prior occupant of the premises.
137. Moore v. Metropolitan Util., 477 P.2d 692, 694 (Okla. 1970).
138. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §§25-4.113(4)(b), -6.105(8)(a) (1969). An analogous situation
is presented when the consumer is threatened with termination of one type of utility service
because of delinquent payments for another service. This problem was discussed in Edris
v. Sebring Util. Comm'n, 237 So. 2d 585 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
139. In a concurring opinion of a Federal Communications Commission decision validating a utility's practice of not furnishing service for an unlawful purpose, two of the
commissioners stated: "Telephone service has assumed an important, almost indispensable,
place in our everyday lives. To permit the discontinuance of such a service by the telephone
company upon request to them by a law enforcement agency or upon any other basis of
information that the telephone is being used for an unlawful purpose without first giving
the customer an opportunity to be heard as the present tariff provides appears to us to be
unjust and unreasonable." Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 92 P.U.R. (n.s.) 1, 9 (Federal
Communications Comm'n 1951).
One federal court has distinguished between the consequences of termination of service
in determining whether a pre-termination hearing was necessary. A carrier acting pursuant
to §13a of the Interstate Commerce Act may discontinue service on thirty days notice
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phone service is discontinued because of its alleged use for gambling activity
the subscribers may still be deprived of property without due process if they
are not afforded an opportunity to defend themselves. 40
These situations present problems that should be determined in a fair
hearing prior to termination of service. The utility regulations of some states
anticipate these situations, but in most cases the reasonableness of grounds
for termination must be determined as the facts arise. Herein lies the value
of a pre-termination hearing. In a hearing such disputed issues as initial
eligibility to receive service, liability for delinquent payments, and fault in
violation of utility regulations could be determined.
The hearing need not be a formal proceeding but should provide the
basic rudiments of fair procedure such as personal appearance, representation if desired, presentation of evidence, and confrontation and crossexamination of witnesses. Since any hearing provided by a utility will be
presided over by representatives of the utility, these procedures are essential
to insure fairness.
THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

An interest as valuable as public utility service must be vigorously protected from arbitrary and capricious interference. 41 Although competition is
often a trustworthy method of protecting the public interest, public utilities
have, by economic necessity, operated as regulated monopolies. 142 In order
to regulate these monopolies the legislature created the Public Service Commission.143 Through analysis of the Commission's broad regulatory powers

without prior hearing where termination poses no threat to life, liberty, or property. New
Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324, 334 (D.N.J. 1958). But see Miller v. Ohio Bell
Tel. Co., 97 P.U.R. (n.s.) 223, 230 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1952), where the commission
deciding on the constitutional issue of deprivation of property without due process, stated:
"Mhe requirement of due process does not always require a hearing before discretion is
exercised, but is satisfied if there is opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination
at some state." Id.
140. Laffer v. Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co., 144 N.E.2d 158, 160 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
1957). Contra, In re Delaware Sports Serv., 196 A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963), aff'd,
202 A.2d 568 (Del. 1964).
141. Even the Public Service Commission itself has recognized the value of utility service with the attendant need for effective regulation. In an action before the Commission
on a proposed rate increase for General Telephone, the Commission noted: "In this day
and age of tremendous economic growth and development . . . adequate and reliable telephone service has become a necessity and our afiluent society will not long tolerate service
that fails to meet its reasonable requirements." Re General Tel. Co., 86 P.U.R.3d 276, 287
(Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).
142. An important purpose of state regulation of public utilities is prevention of discrimination in service and enforcement of the duty to serve. United Gas Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 278 U.S. 300, 309 (1929).
143. The 1885 constitution, art. 10, §30, provided for legislative power over common
carriers to correct abuses and prevent unjust discrimination by those performing services
of a public nature. Article 12, §10 of the 1968 constitution preserved the former provisions
as a statute. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 223 So. 2d 35, 38 (Fla. 1969).
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over rates and services144 of privately-owned utilities- 5 it is clear that the
legislature intended to vest the police power of the state in the Commission. 14 In every instance where a public service was made subject to the
regulation of the Commission the legislature enacted a comprehensive plan
of regulation.147 Since each chapter of regulations exists independently of
every other chapter there is a patchwork of statutes rather than a uniform
system of regulation.
If public utility service is deemed an entitlement or a right, the question
arises whether the granting and termination of such a right should be
governed by an administrative agency. Generally, judicial powers can only
be exercised by judicial officers and courts.148 The Florida constitution provides, however, that administrative agencies may be authorized by statute
to perform functions that are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature without
violating the separation of powers doctrine. 49 The Public Service Commission has been granted the specific authority to perform judicial functions in
the course of its duties. 50
The Commission's jurisdiction to regulate and supervise each public
utility with respect to rates and service is exclusive.' s' Over other matters,
however, the Commission's jurisdiction is not exclusive. 5 2 Courts have at
least concurrent jurisdiction with the Commission in compelling a public
service company to perform its legal duty. 5 3 Usually the enforcement of
this duty is a matter of private concern between the utility and its customers,
and therefore a proper subject for judicial adjudication.144.

FLA. STAT.

§§366.04, .05, .20 (1969).

145. City of St. Petersburg v. Carter, 30 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1949); FLA. STAT. §366.11
(1969). See also Comment, Public Utilities: Florida's Dual System of Regulation-A Denial
of Adequate Protection to Some Consumer, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 159 (1969), for a discussion
of the inequities resulting from dual regulation of utilities. Municipally owned utilities
are expressly exempted from state supervision. Storey v. Mayo, 217 So. 2d 304, 307 (Fla.
1968).
146. See FiA. STAT. §366.01 (1969).
147. See Radio Tel. Communications v. Southwestern Tel. Co., 170 So. 2d 577, 581
(Fla. 1965); City of West Palm Beach v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 224 So. 2d 322, 325
(Fla. 1969), for the proposition that the Commission has only those powers that are expressly or impliedly conferred upon it by statute.
148. See South Atlantic S.S. Co. v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 449, 190 So. 675, 680-81 (1939);
State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 56 Fla. 617, 631-32, 47 So. 969, 974 (1908).
149. FLA. CONST. art. 5, §1. See also Nelson v. Linsey, 151 Fla. 596, 10 So. 2d 131
(1942); Florida Motors Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876 (1930).
150. FLA. STAT. §§364.20, 366.05 (1969).
151. In case of conflict with other boards, agencies, or political subdivisions the orders
and regulations of the Commission prevail. Florida Power & Light Co. v. City of Miami, 72
So. 2d 270, 273 (Fla. 1954); FLA. STAT. §366.04 (1969). See Storey v. Mayo, 217 So. 2d
304 (Fla. 1968).
152. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Brown, 123 F. 946, 948 (N.D. Fla. 1903); Miami Bridge
Co. v. Miami Ry., 152 Fla. 458, 472-74, 12 So. 2d 438, 445-46 (1943).
153. See also Southwestern Natural Gas Co. v. Cherokee Pub. Serv. Co., 172 Okla. 325,
328-29, 44 P.2d 945, 948 (1955). But see Elk Run Tel. Co. v. General Tel. Co., 160 N.W.2d
311, 315 (Iowa 1968), where the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over matters where
subscribers sought to compel service.
154. Delaware Sports Serv. v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 241 F. Supp. 847, 849 (D. Del.
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The remedies available to an aggrieved consumer appearing before the
Commission are in the form of orders subject to judicial review. 55 These
determinations, however, are presumed valid and will not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous. 156 Although the Commission recognizes both
formal157 and informal 58 proceedings, it must adhere to specific procedural
requirements in all actions.'59 When functioning in its legislative capacity
the Commission must consider the adequacy of service.160 This often requires
the presentation of complaints by subscribers during rate hearings. Because
the Commission always expects some complaints in any proceeding to increase rates, the consumer can be assured only that his complaint will be
given "reasonable weight."' 61
Attorney General as the Public's Advocate
The judicial power of any administrative agency must be exercised
cautiously when adjudicating personal and property rights. In proceedings
before the Public Service Commission the Commission itself is charged with
protecting the public from unreasonable and arbitrary action.16 2 It has,
however, refused to allow the attorney general to act as advocate for the
16 3
general body of consumers throughout the state.'

1965); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Duhvorth, 279 Ky. 309, 314, 130 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1939).

One state has held that the function of its public service commission is to regulate public
utilities only and not to compel enforcement of contractual obligations. Jurisdiction to construe, enforce, or adjudicate the validity of such contracts was dependent upon applicable
statutes. Williams Elec. Corp. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 79 N.W.2d 508, 517 (N.D.

1956).
155. FLA. STAT. §366.10 (1969). See also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Carter, 66 So. 2d
480 (Fla. 1953); Greater Miami Dev. Corp. v. Pender, 142 Fla. 390, 194 So. 867 (1940);
Sweetheart Lake, Inc. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 211 N.C. 269, 189 S.E. 785 (1937).
156. E.g., FLA. STAT. §350.12(2)(m) (1969); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mayo, 207 So.
2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1968); Utilities Operating Co. v. Mayo, 204 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1967); Florida
Power Corp. v. Mayo. 203 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1967); General Tel. Co. v. Carter, 115
So. 2d 554, 556-57 (Fla. 1959).
157. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §25-2.50 (1969).
158. FLA. ADIIN. CODE § §25-2.47, -2.48 (1969).
159. The Florida Public Service Commission is subject to the control of the Administrative Procedure Act; chapter 120, Florida Statutes, which establishes minimum requirements for the adjudication of any party's legal rights, duties, privileges, or immunities.
Van Gorp Van Serv., Inc. v. Mayo, 207 So. 2d 425, 427 (Fla. 1968).
160. Re General Tel. Co., 86 P.U.R.3d 276, 285 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).
161. Id. at 286.
162. City of St. Petersburg v. Carter, 39 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1949). The Commission,
however, is not the sole protector of the public interest. Florida supreme court Justice
Richard Ervin has emphasized that the attorney general, the judiciary, and even utilities
have a concomitant duty to protect the public in the matter of rates, and affected consumers have the right to appear in such hearings to protect their interests. State ex -el.
Shevin v. Yarborough, 257 So. 2d 891, 896 (Fla. 1972) (Ervin, J., concurring opinion).
163. Order Denying Suggestion and Motion of Attorney General, Order No. 5245,
Docket No. 71,370-EU (1971). The commission recognized that it is the function of the
attorney general to perform those duties prescribed by the constitution or required by law
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As a result of this refusal the attorney general sought a writ of mandamus
in State ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough1 64 ordering his intervention on behalf
of the public in rate increase hearings or other proceedings of public importance. The specific question before the court was whether the attorney
general could present evidence that would benefit all citizens of the state
while also representing the state as a substantial consumer. 6s Since the
attorney general appeared on behalf of the state in those suits in which the
state was interested, it was argued that he was obligated by statute 6 to act
on behalf of the public before Commission proceedings. 6 7 Furthermore, the
attorney general contended that, since the Commission is a quasi-judicial
body it cannot serve as an advocate of the public.16s
In opposing the intervention the Commission argued that, since prescribing rates was a legislative function,16 9 the Commission was not acting
as an arbiter in a rate hearing and could therefore adequately represent
the public."1 ° Although the Commission could request the attorney general's
intervention in any proceeding before it'-, or employ other counsel for
advice,'1 2 the Commission denied that the attorney general had the right
1 73
to intervene on behalf of the public as a body of consumers.
The court chose not to distinguish between the attorney general as
representative of the state, as a substantial consumer of utility service, or as
representative of a general body of consumers. Instead, it held: "The
State [was] the people and, therefore, he would have every opportunity
to oppose a rate increase on behalf of the State of Florida as a consumer
which he would have if he were there representing all the people under
a different title."' 4 While serving as arbiter, it follows that the Commission should not be the sole representative of the public. As the people's
advocate, it is the function of the attorney general to represent the public.'7 5
but found no statute authorizing him to represent the consumer before the commission.
Id. at 1-2.
164. 257 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1972).
165. Id. at 893.

166.

See FLA.

STAT.

§ 16.01 (1969).

167. Petitioner's Brief on Jurisdiction and Merits in Support of Petition for Writ of
Mandamus at 7, 13, State ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough, 257 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1972).
168. Id. at 15.
169. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Brown, 123 F. 946, 948 (N.D. Fla. 1903); Miami Bridge
Co. v. Miami Ry., 152 Fla. 458, 473, 12 So. 2d 438, 445-46 (1943).
170. Respondent's Brief on Jurisdiction and Merits in Opposition To Petition for Writ
of Mandamus at 18-20, State ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough, 257 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1972).
171. FLA. STAT. §350.31 (1969).
172. FLA. STAT. §350.30 (1969).
173. In his concurring opinion, Justice Ervin thought it "appropriate to leave to the
Attorney General's sound and reasonable discretion . . . his exercise of the right of legal
advocacy in such situation, case, or instance, subject to the legislature's power to withdraw
or to curtail this right wherever it sees fit, rather than for an administrative board to
decide whether he can appear before it. It is better for him to abuse the authority in a rare
instance than for state agencies exercising quasi-judicial authority to be held to have the
power to eliminate him from appearing before them at their pleasure." 257 So. 2d at 897.
174. 257 So. 2d at 893.
175. In the 1972 session of the Florida Legislature the House of Representatives intro-
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Alternative Remedies
The only alternative to administrative remedies available from the
Public Service Commission is judicial relief. Mandamus and injunction
are the proper remedies in those instances where the courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to enforce a utility's duty to render service ."7 Mandamus will
lie against a public utility that wrongfully refuses to supply gas or electricity
77
to a consumer.
Before a consumer may seek a writ of mandamus, however, he must
show that he is entitled to utility service and will comply with all rules and
regulations of the utility."5 Likewise, the utility must be under a dear legal
duty to render the service. 79 Since mandamus is an original proceeding it
cannot be used for review of Commission orders.8 0 The remedy commonly
used to prevent an unlawful interruption of service causing irreparable
injury to consumers is an injunction.'""
The existence of these remedies, however, has not satisfied the problems
facing utility consumers. Other means are necessary to protect the public
utility consumer, and they can only be formulated by restructuring the
existing system of public utility regulations.
REFORMING UTILITY REGULATION

Existing remedies are often confusing and not always readily accessible
to the average consumer. When threatened with termination of service
duced bill 4030, amending chapter 350 of the Florida Statutes by creating a public counsel
to represent the consumer in hearings before the Public Service Commission. The bill
would have allowed the public counsel to appear in any proceeding before the Commission
in the name of either the state or its citizens and would have given him access to all
files and records of the Commission. The same bill proposed a new section to chapter 16,
which would increase the attorney general's power to intervene in rate hearings when the
state is a substantial consumer of utility service. The bill passed the house of representatives
by a vote of 82 to 24, but failed to reach a vote in the senate prior to adjournment.
176. E.g., Woodbury v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 57 Fla. 249, 49 So. 556 (1909). See also
Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Logan City, 97 Utah 235, 92 P.2d 346 (1939).
177. Florida Power & Light Co. v. State ex rel. Malcolm, 107 Fla. 317, 318-19, 144 So.
657, 658 (1932). But see Gardner v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 P.U.R. (ns.) 398
(Fla. l1th Cir. Ct. 1951), where temporary relief was denied until the customer applied to
the Commission for a hearing or, having shown a valid excuse for not applying, alleged
under oath his intention to do so without delay.
178. Florida Power & Light Co. v. State ex rel. Malcolm, 107 Fla. 317, 319, 144 So. 657,
658 (1932).
179. See Vebb v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 237 A.2d 143, 146 (Del. Ch. 1967); Florida
Power & Light Co. v. State ex rel. Malcolm, 107 Fla. 317, 318-19, 144 So. 657, 658 (1932);
State ex rel. Thalheim v. Louisiana Gas Serv. Co., 107 So. 2d 817, 818 (La. Ct. App. 1959).
See also Miller v. Hillview W\rater Works Project, Inc., 139 So. 2d 337, 341 (Ala. 1962);
Jordan v. Clarke-Washington Elec. Membership Corp., 80 So. 2d 527, 529 (Ala. 1955);
Zuckerman v. New York Tel. Co., 138 N.Y.S.2d 465, 466 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
180. De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957).
181. See Miami Gas Co. v. Highleyman, 77 Fla. 523, 81 So. 775 (1919). In King v.
Brown, 55 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1951), a telephone subscriber was granted a temporary injunction to enjoin termination of service.
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or even inadquate service, immediate and efficient procedures for relief
should be available.
If the consumer chooses to go before the Public Service Commission
he is faced with technical and cumbersome procedures.18 2 Even informal procedures may be so remote from the consumer that he is left waiting indefinitely for a response to his complaint. Moreover, the large number of
utility consumers in the state makes both formal and informal proceedings
before the Commission impractical. The only review of formal orders of the
Commission is by certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida.1 8 3 This
process is not only complicated but is also unrealistic. Since informal orders
are not specifically granted review by statute, failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be raised as a defense by the utility in subsequent
court action by the consumer.184 Even if successful, obtaining relief by injunction or mandamus is an expensive and time-consuming process.
If the consumer deals directly with the utility he often discovers that
his complaints are frustrated by bureaucratic office procedures and biased
regulations formulated by the utility. Many times interpretation of the
utility's regulations is left to office personnel. This often results in wide
discretion being vested in persons unqualified to determine the reasonableness of alleged grounds for termination or the validity of a consumer's
complaint. The consumer, already in an unequal bargaining position, can
do little if the utility decides adversely. The average consumer rarely
reaches top management with his complaint. Instead, he must usually abide
by the utility's decision; the only other alternative is resort to the courts
or the Public Service Commission.
The lack of adequate and practical consumer remedies emphasizes the
need for such readily accessible solutions and protective devices as pretermination hearings and fair representation of the consumer before both the
utility and Public Service Commission.
Reorganization of the Public Service Commission
The need for reformation of the current system of public utility regulation is evident. Although the Public Service Commission has been empowered to regulate utilities and protect the public from abuses, 85 the
utility consumer has been neglected in the shadow of giant public service
corporations. The Commission's time and energy is spent considering rate
increases, franchises, service agreements, and other problems of the utility
industry.186 When the Commission must determine whether an existing

182. For example, §25-2.56 of the Florida Administrative Code requires the complainant to submit 15 copies of his complaint to the Commission prior to the proceedings.
183. FLA. STAT. §366.10 (1969).
184. See Price v. General Tel., No. 197,854 (Cir. Ct., Hillsborough County, Div. A,
filed in 1971).
185. FLA. STAT. §350.011 (1969).
186, See FLA. STAr. §350.12 (1969).
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rate structure justifies an increase, few resources are left to aid the consumer
187
in satisfying a complaint concerning his service.
A plan to reorganize the Commission is now under study by the House
Select Committee on the Public Service Commission as part of the Governor's
reorganization proposals. The plan calls for creation of a new Department
of Utilities and Public Service and a governor appointed secretary with
supervisory power to replace the present commissioners' staff. The proposal
seeks to relieve the commissioners of administrative and supervisory duties
while enabling them to devote more time to developing standards and
planning the regulatory program. 88 The separation of administrative and
enforcement functions would also insure that decisions are made openly. 189
The failure of the Commission to deal effectively with consumer interests
originates from its over centralization at the state level with all energies
concentrated on regulating the utility industry. Thus, the Commission should
be localized to be effective in the area of consumer protection. A local office
in each county would provide the necessary outlet for receiving consumer
complaints and expediting action on them. Perhaps the most important
function of a local office would be presiding over pre-termination hearings
to determine whether a discontinuance of service would be justified.
Utility Ombudsman. The concept of a utility ombudsman has been suggested as a means of hearing and acting upon customer complaints. 190
Borrowed from Europe where the ombudsman's task is to act as a check
on the government, the corporate ombudsman is an official of the utility
with whom customers can deal directly when dissatisfied with their service.' 91
To be effective the utility ombudsman must have direct access to the top
echelons of management. Otherwise he will be no more effective than the
ordinary business office of the utility company.
Proposed Intergovernmental Consumer's Counsel Act
The need for consumer protection in the realm of public utility regulation has been recognized on the national as well as the state level. The
proposed Intergovernmental Consumers' Counsel Act of 1969192 is designed
to provide utility consumers with two essential rights: the right to be informed and the right to be heard 93
187.

There are, however, procedures for an informal conference or hearing by which-

a consumer can set forth the facts of his complaint. Although it is an attempt to settle
disputes amicably without formal procedures, it is still insufficient to deal with all consumer complaints. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE §25-2.47 (1969).
188. Among those proposals finally voted on were FLA. H. 5062, increasing the number
of commissioners from 3 to 5 with each commissioner elected from a separate district and
Fla. H. 4030, creating a public counsel to represent the public before Commission hearings.
189. See FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1969) (Florida's "Government in the Sunshine" Law).
190. Purcell, Who Needs an Ombudsman?, 86 Pus. UTtL. FORT. 13 (1970).
191. Id.
192. See 115 CoNC. REc. 1765-74 (1969).
193. When introducing the bill,-Senator Lee Metcalf renounced utility regulation as a
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. The most significant aspect of the Act is the establishment of an independent agency known as the United States Office of Utility Consumers'
Counsel.194 This agency would represent the federal government and the
public before state and federal commissions and courts. In order to implement its objective the Act provides for federal grants to establish and operate utility consumers' counsels on the state level to collect and disseminate
information relating to utility consumer matters. Such legislation would
encourage states to make utility regulation more meaningful while assuring the consumer of fair representation when dealing with the utility
industry.
Proposed Termination Procedures
Effective utility regulation is most crucial on the local level where the
consumer must deal directly with the utility. Consequently, procedures are
necessary for governing the termination practices of utility companies in
order to protect the consumer's right to uninterrupted service. The following suggestions are in the form of model termination procedures, which
provide the necessary fair hearing prior to termination of service. 19s
Notice. Upon a finding by the utility that a subscriber has violated a
utility regulation or consistently failed to pay his bill, the utility should
provide the subscriber with written notice of the proposed termination. It
should contain a detailed explanation for the proposed termination citing
the specific regulation alleged to have been violated or a computation of
the amount in arrears. The primary purpose of the notice, however, is to
inform the subscriber that he is entitled to a hearing and to specify the time
during which he may request one.
Fair Hearing. Utility companies customarily discontinue utility service
without first affording the subscriber timely notice or an opportunity to be
heard. To avoid a violation of procedural due process it is urged that fair
hearing termination procedures be instituted locally to guarantee that the
consumer will not be unjustifiably denied service. The pre-termination
hearing would determine whether reasonable grounds exist for discontinuing
service and would allow the consumer an opportunity to contest the proposed termination.
myth perpetuated by the utility industry itself at the customer's expense through advertising
and public relations programs. He charged: "When regulation is actually attempted, the
utilities' research, presentations, and consultants are financed from customer-paid operating
expenses. The public pays. However, no provision is made, through either the tax or rate
structure, for similar presentation of the public's case. The utilities do not want that, and
their view prevails." 115 CONG. REC. 1765 (1969).
194. S. 607, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §101 (a) (1969). The Act is currently under study in
the Committee on Governmental Operations.
195. These procedures were suggested by model regulations formulated by the Legal
Assistance Program of Ramsey County, St. Paul, Minnesota. These procedures appear in 5
CLEARINGHOUSE REV.

219-20 (1971).
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. Since the utility and consumer are the adverse parties, a fair hearing
must be conducted by an impartial body. A consumer cannot be guaranteed
impartial consideration of his objections if the hearing is presided over by
officials of the same utility that is presenting adverse arguments in the controversy. To insure impartiality the hearing should be conducted by a local
office of the Public Service Commission. As arbiter, the Commission could
insure fair representation of the consumer's interest and prevent undue
pressure upon the consumer by the utility. If the utility were to preside
over tie pre-termination hearings it could easily pressure the consumer into
surrendering his rights.
Procedures and Evidence. The hearing, since it is conducted by an administrative agency, would be subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. 1 6
In addition, the fundamental rudiments of a fair hearing must be guaranteed-specifically, the right to appear in person and be represented by
counsel, if desired. Although representation by legal counsel is not necessary,
the Commission should make available to the subscriber a knowledgeable
member of the Commission to assist the consumer in conforming to the
procedures and to inform him of the constitutional protections to which he
is entitled during the hearing. These include the right to present documentary evidence supporting his objection to termination and the right
to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the utility.
The rules for admissibility of evidence in civil trials should not be
applied strictly, since the consumer should not be burdened with such
technical rules when opposing skilled counsel of the utility. 1 7 Instead, the
hearing examiner should accept all evidence informally and be responsible
for weighing its value. The burden, however, should remain on the utility
to show a clear violation of rules that justifies termination.
Decisions of the Commission. All decisions must not only state the Commission's findings of fact but also the reasons for the decision. This will
require a determination of the validity of the utility's justification for the
proposed termination. Decisions of the Commission should not diminish the
legal remedies available either to the utility or the consumer. Utility service
should not be terminated pending the decision by the Commission, since its
very purpose is to prevent uninterrupted service unless termination is clearly justified.
CONCLUSION

Regulation of public utilities has traditionally been accepted where
necessities of life are provided by monopolies. However, such regulation
has usually been directed at those problems plaguing the utility industry
rather than at correcting abuses suffered by consumers. Application of the

196.

FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1969).

197.

See generally FLA. STAT. §350.35 (1969).
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common law regulating common carriers to regulation of giant utility corporations has required utilities to provide adequate service without discrimination.198 Such a vague obligation has led public service commissions and

utilities to define the requirements of fair treatment of the consumer in
terms of "reasonableness" and has not provided a clear and concise interpretation of what procedures are reasonable as opposed to being arbitrary and
capricious. As a result, most regulations and procedures intended for the
protection of consumers are discretionary and vague.
Until recently, when constitutional rights were mentioned in connection
with the law of public utilities, such rights belonged only to the utility.
Through the emergence of consumer protection law, however, the public
utility consumer is asserting those rights that have traditionally been reserved
to the utilities. Just as the utility's franchise is a property right, the consumer may also claim a property right in the utility's service. The time is
long overdue for recognition of public utility consumer rights. They should
be even more closely guarded by constitutional guarantees, since infringement of the rights of an individual can be justified even less than infringement upon the rights of a corporation.
ELLEN CONDON

198. The duty of the common carrier has been defined in early Florida cases in the
following manner: "The duty of a railroad company to carry and charge only reasonable
compensation are incidents of its occupation as a common carrier. . . It is the duty of
a common carrier to receive and carry whatever is properly offered to it for carriage ...
The safety of human life and the good of every public interest require of them the soundest
condition, the fullest equipment, and most skillful and careful operation; and it is the
province of the Courts to enforce . . . the laws which imposes these entirely proper and
indispensable demands." Pensacola & Atlantic R.R. v. State, 25 Fla. 310, 324-26, 5 So. 833,
839-40 (1889). See State ex rel. Ellis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 53 Fla. 650, 670-71, 44 So.
213, 218 (1907). See also Postal Cable Tel. Co. v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 177 F. 726,
728 (M.D. Tenn. 1910), where the law governing common carriers was applied to telephone
regulation.
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